On the morning of 27 June 2025, the Marshall Islands registered bulk carrier Altay was loading scrap metal into its aft cargo hold at Albert Dock, Hull, England.

At 0948, the master observed smoke rising from the cargo and immediately activated the general alarm and called for the shore grab operator to discharge cargo to remove or expose the source of the fire. Meanwhile, the crew mustered and prepared firefighting equipment.

By 0958, two firefighting teams had proceeded to the aft cargo hold to apply water from the port and starboard sides. Additionally, other crew members cleaned the hatch coamings ready for the hatch covers to be closed if necessary. Ashore, the terminal supervisor called the emergency services.

At 1030, several shore fire and rescue service appliances arrived and, after coordinating with Altay’s master, started firefighting. Altay’s crew evacuated the vessel and, from the quayside, the master and chief officer monitored the vessel’s draught and checked the vessel’s stability was not compromised by water from the firefighting.

The smoke and continuously evaporating water created a noxious cloud that drifted over the local area (Figure 1 and Figure 2). At 1215, the fire and rescue service issued a safety alert advising nearby residents and businesses to close windows and doors and remain inside. Consequently, several businesses and two main roads were temporarily closed.

The fire was extinguished in the early hours of 28 June. There were no injuries and there was no loss of life. Over several days, Altay discharged the contaminated firefighting water from the hold into road tankers for disposal. The scrap cargo was discharged and surveyed to check its composition. On 14 July 2025, the ship was surveyed for damage.

Significant heat damage was found to structural steelwork in the aft cargo hold. The Maritime and Coastguard Agency attended and permitted Altay to leave port on 27 July and proceed to a drydock in Turkey for repairs.

Findings

The fire was likely caused by an undischarged battery or other ignition source, causing a spark during loading that ignited combustible material in the scrap cargo.

The scrap cargo had been collected from several sources and the recipient company, The Griffiths Group Limited, expected its suppliers to screen their product to remove hazardous material such as combustibles and batteries.

Deliveries of scrap cargo to Hull were visually checked on arrival. There was no additional sorting and screening facility to ensure that contaminants were not present.

The cargo had been classified as group C[footnote 1] scrap metal under the International Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes (IMSBC) Code, which did not require the shipper to declare hazard identification and cargo composition. However, the scrap cargo contained hazardous impurities, including batteries, oil drums, and oily residues, which posed a fire risk.

Actions taken

Altay’s operator, Beyaz Denizcilik Ltd Şti, has:

• arranged repairs to the vessel
• highlighted to its crews the importance of cargo loading monitoring and cargo pre-loading inspection.

The owner of the cargo loading facility, The Griffiths Group Limited, ceased trading following the incident.

Press Release