Son of Iran’s Supreme Leader Advisor Ran Vast Sanctions-Evasion Fleet, U.S. Says

The U.S. Department of the Treasury has taken action against a sophisticated shipping empire that has been transporting Iranian and Russian oil to global markets while evading international sanctions, marking the largest Iran-related sanctions package since 2018.

The Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has designated more than 50 individuals and entities and identified over 50 vessels that form part of this vast network, which has generated tens of billions of dollars in profit for the Iranian regime.

At the center of this sprawling operation is Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, son of Ali Shamkhani, a top political advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader. According to Treasury officials, Hossein leverages his father’s political connections at the highest levels of the Iranian regime to operate a massive fleet of tankers and containerships.

“The Shamkhani family’s shipping empire highlights how the Iranian regime elites leverage their positions to accrue massive wealth and fund the regime’s dangerous behavior,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “The over 115 sanctions issued today are the largest to-date since the Trump Administration implemented our campaign of maximum pressure on Iran. These actions put America first by targeting regime elites that profit while Tehran threatens the safety of the United States.”

The network employs sophisticated methods to disguise its operations, including frequent changes in vessel management and operators to obscure ownership trails. Hossein himself exclusively uses aliases when conducting business, including “H,” “Hector,” and “Hugo Hayek” – the latter being the false name listed on his Dominica passport.

The operation represents one of the most complex sanctions-evasion networks uncovered in recent years. The fleet consists of both oil tankers and containerships that transport Iranian and Russian petroleum products primarily to buyers in China.

Treasury investigations revealed that the network’s vessels have been given preferential treatment when loading or unloading in Iranian ports, further indicating high-level regime support.

The Shamkhani network’s primary operational hub appears to be the United Arab Emirates, where numerous front companies have been established. One key entity, Marvise SMC DMCC (formerly Mairin Ship Management and Consultancy DMCC), provides management services to many of Hossein’s shipping firms and secretly controls a fleet of dozens of vessels that publicly appear to be owned by multiple other companies.

Beyond oil transport, the network has also been implicated in the movement of military goods. In 2024, Hossein’s network was publicly exposed for shipping missiles, drone components, and dual-use goods from Iran to Russia in exchange for shipments of Russian petroleum.

The network employs numerous deception tactics, including turning off vessel AIS transponders during loading operations and misrepresenting cargo information in bills of lading. For example, the Liberia-flagged BIGLI (IMO 9307047) was found to have loaded Iranian petrochemicals that were then discharged in China, with documentation showing signs of possible modification.

Perhaps most concerning to international financial regulators is the elaborate money laundering operation established to handle the billions in illicit profits. According to Treasury documents, these funds are transferred through a global network of front companies designed to disguise the trail back to Iran.

This investigation represents a coordinated effort across multiple U.S. government agencies. The Department of State is concurrently designating 20 entities and identifying 10 vessels as blocked property for their involvement in the trade and transport of Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products.

These latest actions were taken pursuant to Executive Order 13902, which targets those operating in certain sectors of the Iranian economy, and is part of the implementation of National Security Presidential Memorandum 2, which institutes a campaign of maximum economic pressure on Iran.

Maritime industry observers note that this case highlights the ongoing challenges in enforcing sanctions against sophisticated state-backed networks that continue to find new methods to circumvent international restrictions on Iranian oil exports.